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FORCEFUL MINIMALISM, HEIN V. FREEDOM FROM
RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC., AND THE PRUDENCE OF
“NOT DOING”
Brendan R. McNamara
Abstract: Proponents of judicial minimalism argue that courts should issue narrow rulings
that address only the issues necessary to resolve the case at hand and should avoid needlessly
broad rulings that could result in unforeseen consequences. The recent Supreme Court
decision in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. provides a compelling case
study of judicial minimalism. Resisting opposing calls for broader rulings from both the
concurring and dissenting justices, a plurality of the Court followed a minimalist approach to
resolve a difficult question of taxpayer standing. Generally, federal taxpayers do not have
standing to challenge government expenditures of tax funds in federal court. In Flast v.
Cohen, the Court carved out a narrow exception for challenges to expenditures that allegedly
violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. This exception requires a connection
between the constitutional violation and Congress’s use of its taxing and spending power.
Hein involved a challenge to purely executive actions, and the Court faced the issue of
whether to expand Flast to cover such actions. While some Justices called for completely
overruling Flast in all situations and others called for expanding Flast to cover purely
executive actions, the plurality took a narrower approach, denying standing without
expanding or contracting the taxpayer standing doctrine. This Note builds on prior
scholarship that advocates for judicial minimalism by arguing that Hein’s plurality opinion
demonstrates judicial minimalism succeeding in practice.

INTRODUCTION
Justice Brandeis famously said about the Supreme Court’s role, “[t]he
most important thing we do is not doing.”1 Judicial review, the power to
strike down laws, essentially amounts to the power to negate the acts of
the popularly elected and politically accountable branches of
government. This power is not one to wield lightly. Rather, judicial
review “is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy . . . .”2 Judicial
minimalists embrace the view that courts should only do as much as
necessary to dispose of the case at hand and no more.3 If all judicial

1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
71 (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962).

OF POLITICS

2. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892).
3. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
ix−x (1999).
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decisions run the risk of being wrong, minimalist decisions run this risk
only when necessary.
This Note uses a recent Supreme Court decision, Hein v. Freedom
From Religion Foundation, Inc.,4 to argue for judicial minimalism as a
general method of adjudication. In Hein, the Court faced a choice
between issuing a narrow or broad ruling.5 The case presented an issue
of standing—specifically, whether federal taxpayers have standing to
challenge executive actions that allegedly violate the Establishment
Clause.6 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion denied standing on narrow
grounds by distinguishing prior precedent.7 Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, argued for a broad resolution that would overrule
precedents on which standing could be based and thereby deny
standing.8 The dissent argued for interpreting prior precedents
expansively to allow standing.9 Justice Kennedy also wrote a separate
concurrence discussing concerns about separation of powers.10
This Note argues that Justice Alito’s plurality opinion in Hein
resolves the case in the best way. This view contradicts that taken by
many of the legal commentators who reacted to the case when the
opinions were issued.11 Further, this Note analyzes the divergent
jurisprudence of Justice Alito’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions in Hein,
explores how the facts in Hein fit into taxpayer standing doctrine, and

4. 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
5. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 10−11 (discussing how minimalists prefer rulings to be narrow
rather than wide). Although Professor Sunstein uses “wide” rather than “broad,” this Note uses the
term “broad” as synonymous and interchangeable with “wide.”
6. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
7. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined this opinion. Id. For discussion of how this
opinion distinguished prior precedents, see infra Part III.
8. Id. at 2573−74 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the dissent.
Id.
10. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, Three Important Developments Involving Law and Religion
During
The
Summer
of
2007,
FINDLAW’S
WRIT,
Sep.
6,
2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20070906.html (describing the plurality’s reasoning as
“intellectually and morally indefensible”); Posting of David Stras to SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/commentary-and-analysis/the-significance-of-hein-part-two-of-two/
(June 26, 2007, 15:49 EDT) (questioning the plurality’s basis for distinguishing the facts of Hein
from
Flast
v.
Cohen);
Posting
of
Jack
Balkin
to
Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/06/bomb-throwers-and-dismantlers-some.html (June 25, 2007,
13:55 EDT) (describing the Hein plurality as “a decision that made little sense as a principled
matter”).
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argues that the plurality’s minimalist approach best exemplifies the
prudence of “not doing” more than necessary to resolve a case. This
narrow ruling avoids a drastic change in a settled area of law that has not
proven to need an abrupt about face, while leaving room in the future for
further modifications as they may prove necessary upon consideration of
cases with facts that compel broader judicial action.
Part I of this Note provides background on judicial minimalism and
explains how standing doctrine and stare decisis accord with
minimalism. Part II summarizes the development and status of federal
taxpayer standing doctrine before Hein, providing context for the
precedents that Justice Scalia would overturn and noting the narrow
manner in which the Court has both written and construed these
precedents. Part III analyzes Hein’s separate opinions, compares the
case’s facts to prior precedents, and explains which opinion of the
fractured Court controls. Finally, Part IV explains why minimalism is
the best solution for Hein and explores areas where minimalism will not
be the best approach.
I.

MINIMALISM, STANDING DOCTRINE, AND STARE
DECISIS LIMIT THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS

Minimalism, standing doctrine, and stare decisis all further a common
purpose of limiting the role of federal courts,12 along with other
doctrines like constitutional avoidance13 and Pullman abstention.14
Taken together, these doctrines further the minimalist goal of doing as
little as necessary and resolving cases narrowly.
To illustrate, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.15
epitomizes minimalism’s virtues. The case involved an Equal Protection

12. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 262 (linking minimalism to standing and other methods of
limiting the reach of judicial decisions).
13. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345−48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (listing when the Court should and should not rule on the constitutionality of a
congressional statute).
14. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman created an equitable
abstention doctrine to discourage federal courts from hearing disputes over difficult constitutional
issues when a case could be resolved on state law grounds; thus, the doctrine may be viewed as a
form of constitutional avoidance. See Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 590, 590 (1977); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1188−90 (5th ed. 2003).
15. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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challenge to segregation on railroad cars,16 a direct attack on another
famous railroad segregation case, Plessy v. Ferguson.17 While the Court
unanimously overruled Plessy in 1954,18 this consensus may not have
been possible thirteen years earlier in Pullman.19 In dismissing the
federal lawsuit and leaving the issue—whether the Texas Railroad
Commission had the authority to issue the contested order20—to be
resolved on state law grounds,21 the Court prevented an unnecessary
decision on the merits. How might the law have developed if the Court
reached the merits in Pullman and reaffirmed Plessy in 1941?
Alternatively, considering the resistance to the unanimous Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka22 decision thirteen years later, what would
have happened if a narrow majority overruled Plessy in 1941?
Minimalists seek to avoid ensnaring unelected judges in these political
traps. The following sections of Part I describe the doctrines of
minimalism, standing, and stare decisis in greater detail.
A.

Minimalist Judges Resolve Each Case on Narrow Grounds

Judicial minimalists23 decide only the issues necessary to resolve each
case or controversy, while leaving extraneous issues to be resolved
another time, if at all.24 The point of minimalism is to write narrow
opinions that only address the issues necessary to adjudicate a case,
16. Id. at 497−98.
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494−95 (1954).
19. See Judith Resnick, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: Revising the Domain of Federal
Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1039 (1994)
(“In 1941 it was, I take it, not obvious how federal constitutional law would decide this question. It
was not easy because national norms did not readily trump local customs and prejudices, indeed
because national norms may well have shared such prejudices.”); FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at
1189−90.
20. The Texas Railroad Commission issued an order mandating that all sleeping cars operated in
Texas be operated by conductors (who were exclusively white) rather than porters (who were
exclusively black). See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497–98. If Texas law did not grant the Commission the
power to issue such an order, that would render the federal Equal Protection challenge moot. See id.
at 501.
21. Id. at 498−99.
22. 347 U.S. 483, 494−95 (1954).
23. This Note treats judicial minimalism as a jurisprudential lens through which to view
procedural doctrines such as standing and stare decisis. This explains why this Note proceeds first
with a discussion of minimalism and then with a discussion of standing and stare decisis.
24. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at ix (“A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves
many things undecided.”).

290

MCNAMARA_FINAL_2.DOC

6/10/2008 5:52:02 PM

Forceful Minimalism
rather than to write broad opinions designed to address entire swathes of
potential cases.25 While minimalism is a form of restraint, minimalism
differs from the concept of judicial restraint because the latter focuses on
giving deference to decisions of the political branches.26 In contrast to
judges embracing judicial restraint, a minimalist judge has no problem
striking down popularly enacted laws if the resolution of a case demands
that result.27 Mindful both of the apparent contradiction of allowing nonelected federal judges to strike down popularly enacted laws within a
democratic system of government,28 and of the inherent risk that any
decision might lead to negative consequences,29 the minimalist exercises
restraint by resisting the urge to rule broadly.
Minimalism is a natural outgrowth of the common-law system.30
Rather than laying out broad rules designed to apply prospectively to a
wide range of situations, courts build the common law as a wall in which
each case forms a brick.31 The common law accretes over time from the
resolution of individual fact scenarios into a body of precedent that
guides subsequent judges by analogy in a wide range of situations.32 If
one case proves to have been incorrectly decided, a later judge may
replace that brick without having to build an entirely new wall.33
25. See id. at 10 (“[M]inimalists try to decide cases rather than to set down broad rules.”).
26. See id. at x (“Judicial minimalism can be characterized as a form of ‘judicial restraint,’ but it
is certainly not an ordinary form.”); id. at 261 (“A maximalist, for example, may be entirely devoted
to the principle of judicial restraint; consider the idea that all congressional enactments should be
upheld.”). For an example of using the term “judicial restraint” to refer to minimalism, see In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Henderson, J.,
concurring) (advocating “judicial restraint” in ruling on the existence of a federal reporter-source
privilege “[b]ecause my colleagues and I agree that any federal common-law reporter’s privilege
that may exist is not absolute and that the Special Counsel’s evidence defeats whatever privilege we
may fashion, we need not, and therefore should not, decide anything more today than that the
Special Counsel’s evidentiary proffer overcomes any hurdle, however high, a federal common-law
reporter’s privilege may erect.”).
27. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at x (“Minimalist judges are entirely willing to invalidate some
laws.”).
28. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16−23. Professor Bickel called this the “Counter-Majoritarian
Difficulty.” Id.
29. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 46.
30. Cf. id. at 44 (“Judges who rely on cases can reduce the burden of decisions; at least for the
individual judge, reliance on past cases may well be better on this count than attempts to build law
from the ground up.”).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 42 (“Analogical reasoning is part and parcel of . . . minimalism. It is of course a
hallmark of legal reasoning to proceed by reference to actual and hypothetical cases.”).
33. See id. at 44 (“[P]ast cases might well be distinguished if they seem to go wrong as applied to
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Standing Doctrine Accords with Minimalism

Standing doctrine ensures that federal courts only exercise their
power when necessary to resolve a valid dispute between adverse
parties. Article III of the United States Constitution grants jurisdiction to
enumerated types of “Cases” and “Controversies,”34 and federal courts
have interpreted this jurisdictional limitation to restrict the power of the
federal courts to rule on actual cases and controversies.35 Standing,
along with related justiciability doctrines,36 maintains the separation of
powers of the three branches of government by defining “the proper––
and properly limited––role of the courts in a democratic society.”37 To
borrow a famous phrase from the administrative law context, standing
helps ensure that the federal judicial power remains “canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing.”38 The Court has firmly established
that standing is an essential part of separation of powers.39
Like its fellow justiciability doctrines, standing reduces the reach of
federal judicial power. To the judicial minimalist, this is desirable. Just
as minimalism counsels that courts should rule only on the issues
necessary to resolve each case, it also insists that courts should resolve
each case only when given the power to do so.40 This approach
maintains separation of powers by ensuring that courts pass judgment,
and thus run the risk of error, only when they have been given such
power and only when reaching a judgment on the merits is necessary.41
Because the judicial power only extends to justiciable cases, rulings in
new circumstances.”).
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
35. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498−99 (1975).
36. In addition to standing, justiciability doctrines include ripeness, mootness, and the bans on
deciding political questions and issuing advisory opinions. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 43–172 (5th ed. 2007); FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 55–267.
37. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
38. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (arguing
that separation of powers requires Congress to place limits on the powers it delegates to
administrative agencies).
39. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 752 (1984); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
40. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 39–40 (“[T]he principles [of justiciability] are obviously an
effort to minimize the judicial presence in American public life . . . . [f]or example, a judgment that
a complex issue is not now ripe for decision may minimize the risk of error and increase the scope
for continuing democratic deliberation on the problem at hand.”); see also id. at 39 (linking
minimalism to the “passive virtues” discussed in BICKEL, supra note 1, at 111–98).
41. See id. at 40.
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cases where plaintiffs lack standing are illegitimate and undermine the
judiciary’s stature in a government of separated and enumerated
powers.42 In disputes involving contentious public rights such as
religious freedom, standing doctrine prevents federal courts from sailing
into treacherous political waters without the anchor of a true case or
controversy.43 Because minimalism seeks to limit the risk of error
created by judicial involvement in divisive political battles,44 standing
requirements for Establishment Clause litigation provide fertile ground
to explore minimalism.
C.

Stare Decisis Works in Tandem with Minimalism to Limit the Role
of Federal Courts

Stare decisis, literally “to stand by things decided,”45 governs the
continued validity and precedential value of case holdings.46 The Court
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,47 faced
with the choice of affirming or overruling the landmark abortion case
Roe v. Wade,48 discussed the factors that courts must weigh when
deciding whether to overrule precedent.49 The Court stated that the best
justification to overrule a precedent is that the precedent has proven
itself to be so clearly erroneous as to demand its abandonment.50
Because this situation occurs rarely, courts may consider other factors
when determining whether to overrule precedent.51 These factors include
whether the rule set forth in the challenged precedent: (1) defies
“practical workability,” (2) has been relied upon such that overruling
would result in hardship, (3) has become a remnant of an abandoned
doctrine, or (4) relies on outdated facts such that the rule has lost
“significant application or justification.”52 By limiting the circumstances
42. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 111, 117 (viewing standing as a “passive virtue” that limits
courts to their legitimate role in a democracy).
43. Cf. FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 127–28.
44. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 4−5.
45. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
46. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (affirming the
“central rule” of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
47. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 854−55.
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under which controlling precedent may be abandoned, stare decisis
tethers the Court to its prior rulings and constrains the scope of future
decisions.
In sum, the doctrines of minimalism, standing, and stare decisis all
ensure that the judicial branch operates within a limited sphere.
Minimalist judges limit their rulings to address only what is necessary;
standing limits courts to hearing only those cases brought by proper
plaintiffs; stare decisis keeps judges bound to the decisions of prior
courts.53
II.

FEDERAL TAXPAYERS HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE
A NARROW CLASS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
VIOLATIONS

Citizens claiming standing based on their status as federal taxpayers
face an uphill battle in convincing a federal court to adjudicate their
cases. The Supreme Court has held that taxpayers do not have standing
to challenge the constitutionality of federal statutes.54 In Flast v.
Cohen,55 the Court carved out an exception for certain Establishment
Clause claims.56 In cases subsequent to Flast and preceding Hein, the
Court clarified and cabined the limits of this exception.57
A.

Taxpayers Generally Do Not Have Standing to Challenge the
Constitutionality of Federal Statutes

Standing doctrine requires that a plaintiff bringing a cause of action in
federal court have suffered a personal injury.58 From time to time,
federal taxpayers seek to establish standing by framing the injury as the
53. For a discussion of how stare decisis furthers judicial restraint, see Thomas W. Merrill,
Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271,
277– 82 (2005). As discussed at supra note 26, though minimalism differs from judicial restraint,
the terms are often used interchangeably or used to refer to the same concept of limiting the scope
of judicial decision-making.
54. See infra Part II. A.
55. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
56. See infra Part II.B.
57. See infra Part II.C.
58. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984). In addition to the injury requirement, there must be a causal link between the plaintiff’s
injury and the alleged wrongful acts of the defendant, and the remedy sought must redress the
plaintiff’s injury. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also id. at 753 n.19 (clarifying that the causation and
redressability requirements of standing are distinct and separate requirements).
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financial injury of paying taxes.59 Although taxpayers have standing to
challenge the collection of a specific tax on the grounds that the tax itself
violates a constitutional provision,60 a tougher question emerges when a
plaintiff asserts standing as a federal taxpayer and the alleged
unconstitutional act is not the imposition of the tax but rather how the
taxes are spent. The Supreme Court first ruled on the ability of federal
taxpayers61 to challenge the constitutionality of federal spending in
Frothingham v. Mellon.62
In Frothingham, the plaintiffs challenged a federal appropriations
statute, the Maternity Act of 1921,63 on the ground that the statute
invaded state sovereignty,64 thus violating the Tenth Amendment.65 Mrs.
Frothingham argued, in effect, that she had standing as a federal
taxpayer because the allegedly unconstitutional spending for the
Maternity Act increased her tax burden without due process of law.66
The Court rejected this argument, declaring that an individual taxpayer
has so minute an interest in the pool of federal tax funds that there is no
individualized interest or injury; therefore, Mrs. Frothingham did not
59. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing
Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 771–73 (2003) (citing various taxpayer standing lawsuits).
60. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553,
2563 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citing Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944)). Follett
involved a prosecution for selling books without a locally required license. Follett, 321 U.S. at 574.
The defendant there was a Jehovah’s Witness who challenged the license statute as violating his
right to free exercise of religion. Id. The Supreme Court held that the license fee amounted to an
unconstitutional tax on constitutionally protected religious activity. Id. at 577.
61. For a thorough exploration of the history of state and municipal taxpayer standing in federal
court, see generally Staudt, supra note 59. As Professor Staudt notes, whether state and municipal
taxpayers have standing to sue in state courts presents a different question governed by state law
and not subject to federal standing doctrine. Id. at 775. The contours of state and municipal taxpayer
standing, both in federal and in state courts, are beyond the scope of this Note.
62. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon).
Although Mrs. Frothingham claimed standing as a federal taxpayer, Massachusetts challenged the
federal appropriations statute as a violation of its sovereignty over state affairs. Id. at 480. The Court
dismissed both cases on justiciability grounds. Id. (“We have reached the conclusion that the cases
must be disposed of for want of jurisdiction without considering the merits of the constitutional
questions.”). Although the term “standing” had not yet been widely adopted to refer to these types
of justiciability issues, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 126 n.1, this Note will use the term
“standing” for clarity.
63. 42 Stat. 224, 224–26 (1921), 42 U.S.C. §§ 161–175 (1925) (repealed 1929). The Act
“provided federal financial support for state programs to reduce maternal and infant mortality . . . .”
FALLON ET AL., supra note 14, at 127.
64. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
66. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486.
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have standing to bring her claim in federal court.67 Instead, the Court
characterized an individual taxpayer’s injury as one suffered in common
with people generally.68 Additionally, the Court reasoned that the
judiciary has no power to rule on the validity of congressional acts in a
vacuum and thus, when a taxpayer seeks a judicial remedy, the taxpayer
must show “not only that the statute is invalid but [also] that [the party]
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement.”69 Consequently, an injury suffered
“in some indefinite way in common with people generally” cannot
support a valid case or controversy.70
In a subsequent state taxpayer standing case, the Court further
expounded on the limitations of taxpayer injury.71 In Doremus v. Board
of Education of the Borough of Hawthorne,72 the plaintiffs challenged
the practice of teachers reciting Bible verses in New Jersey public
schools73 under the Establishment Clause,74 claiming standing as state
and municipal taxpayers.75 The Court declined to review the state court’s
decision, holding that the plaintiffs had no standing in federal court.76 In
addressing the issue of taxpayer injury, the Court quoted favorably from
the state high court ruling that the brief recitation from the Old
67. Id. at 487.
68. Id. at 488–89. Such injuries are known as generalized grievances. See, e.g., William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (“If a plaintiff can show
sufficient injury to satisfy Article III, he must also satisfy prudential concerns about, for
example . . . whether he should be able to litigate generalized social grievances.”).
69. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488.
70. Id. But see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19, 21, 23−24 (1998) (holding that
when a statute grants a cause of action to any person “aggrieved” by an action of the Federal
Election Commission, an aggrieved plaintiff has standing if the injury is “concrete” even if it is one
shared by many others).
71. Although the plaintiffs brought suit in state court claiming standing as state taxpayers, the
Supreme Court reviewed the case because the complaint alleged violations of the Establishment
Clause. Doremus v. Board of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 430, 432 (1952).
72. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
73. Id. at 430.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
75. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 432. One plaintiff also claimed standing as a parent of a child subject to
the challenged law, but the Court dismissed this as moot because the child had already graduated.
Id. at 432–33.
76. Id. at 435. Cf. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989) (holding that only the party
seeking Supreme Court review of an adverse state court ruling need satisfy federal standing
requirements); id. at 623 n.2 (distinguishing Doremus, where the original state court plaintiff sought
Supreme Court review, from ASARCO, where the original state court defendant-intervenors sought
Supreme Court review).
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Testament each morning added no additional cost to the schools’
operational budget.77 Because the school day lasts a fixed period of time,
the cost of teacher salaries does not change based on lesson content or
classroom speech.78 While the plaintiffs claimed taxpayer injury, there
was no specific appropriation of funds and therefore no taxpayer
standing.79 Despite being a state taxpayer standing case, Doremus is
significant to the federal taxpayer standing doctrine because of this last
distinction: federal taxpayer standing, if it can exist at all, must be linked
to a specific expenditure of funds supporting the challenged activity.80
B.

Flast v. Cohen Created a Narrow Exception That Permits Federal
Taxpayer Standing Under Certain Circumstances

Forty-five years after Frothingham, the Supreme Court carved out a
narrow exception to the general ban on federal taxpayer standing.81 Flast
v. Cohen presented an Establishment Clause challenge to the Secondary
Education Act of 196582 on the ground that the Act authorized states to
give federal education funds to private schools.83 The plaintiffs claimed
standing as taxpayers and specifically challenged the use of federal tax
dollars84 to support religious institutions, characterizing such actions as
“compulsory taxation for religious purposes.”85 The Court held that a
federal taxpayer can have standing to challenge a federal statute by
showing a “logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated.”86

77. Id. at 431 (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 75 A.2d 880, 881−82
(N.J. 1950)).
78. See id.
79. Id. at 434−35.
80. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
81. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (explaining Flast’s holding).
82. 79 Stat. 27, 27–58 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241a (Supp. I 1965) (repealed 1978).
83. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85−86. While the Act only referred to private schools generally and did not
mention private religious schools, during the 1960s the vast majority of private schools were
religiously affiliated. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007),
127 S. Ct. 2553, 2565 n.3 (2007) (plurality opinion).
84. Justice Harlan argued that tax dollars become general funds and lose their identity as tax
dollars once collected, and thus the plaintiffs challenged the use of general funds rather than tax
dollars. Flast, 392 U.S. at 128 (dissenting opinion).
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id. at 102.
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According to Flast, the analysis of whether the required nexus
between federal taxpayer status and the claim to be adjudicated exists
has two parts.87 First, a taxpayer may only challenge federal statutes
passed under the taxing and spending power88 so long as the spending is
not “incidental” to administering “an essentially regulatory statute.”89
The Court noted that Congress appropriated almost one billion dollars to
implement the Secondary Education Act in 196590 and referred to this
amount as “substantial,”91 but Flast’s holding did not explicitly require
that any minimum amount be spent.92 Second, the challenge must be
based on a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending
power.93 The Court held that the Establishment Clause imposes a
limitation on the taxing and spending power, but did not decide whether
any other constitutional provisions impose a similar limitation.94
C.

Later Cases Further Narrowed the Flast Exception

In fact, the Court has never found any additional constitutional
provisions that directly limit the taxing and spending power.95 A few
years after Flast, two cases denied taxpayer standing for alleged

87. Id.
88. Id. The Constitution grants Congress the power to tax and spend. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
89. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102 (citing Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342
U.S. 429 (1952)). This restriction means that to pass the first part of the nexus test, Congress must
have allocated money to be spent on the challenged statutory program. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 619 (“We do not think, however, that appellees’ claim that [statutory] funds are being
used improperly by individual grantees is any less a challenge to congressional taxing and spending
power simply because the funding authorized by Congress has flowed through and been
administered by the Secretary.”). Similar to Doremus, a taxpayer would fail the first part of the
nexus test if the challenged statute dictated that a federal employee perform allegedly
unconstitutional activities in the course of employment without providing any additional funding for
these new activities. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102; Doremus, 342 U.S. at 431.
90. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 n.23.
91. Id. at 103.
92. See id. at 105−06. Indeed, the Court seemed to imply that any amount spent would be
sufficient as long as the spending was not incidental to a regulatory scheme as discussed in supra
note 89. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 103−04 (citing 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Hunt ed.
1901)).
93. Id. at 102−03.
94. Id. at 105.
95. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 508 n.18 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In the years since the announcement of
the Flast test we have yet to recognize a similar restriction on Congress’ power to tax, and I know
of none.”).

298

MCNAMARA_FINAL_2.DOC

6/10/2008 5:52:02 PM

Forceful Minimalism
violations of other constitutional provisions.96 The Court recently denied
standing to a state taxpayer challenging an alleged Dormant Commerce
Clause violation.97 Although the Court in Flast left open the possibility
that other constitutional provisions could pass the second part of the
nexus test,98 Flast’s holding has effectively been confined to
Establishment Clause challenges.99 Contrary to Justice Douglas’s
prediction that Flast’s narrow holding would expand and lead to the
gradual erosion of Frothingham,100 later decisions have done just the
opposite: narrowed Flast and reinforced Frothingham.
Even within Flast’s accepted domain, the Establishment Clause, the
Court has applied Flast narrowly. Faced with a federal taxpayer
challenge to a federal government transfer of a surplus World War II
military hospital to a religious school, the Court declined to grant
standing under Flast.101 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separations of Church and State102 distinguished Flast on
two grounds: first, that the transfer of property was a discretionary
decision of an executive agency, rather than congressional action;103
second, that Congress authorized this kind of transfer under the Property
Clause,104 rather than the taxing and spending power.105 As the Court
suggested,106 these two distinctions are really manifestations of the same
underlying issue: the challenged action in Valley Forge did not actually
involve any spending.107 Valley Forge reiterates that Flast only allows
96. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974) (denying
taxpayer standing to challenge Members of Congress serving in the Army Reserve as against the
Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
175 (1974) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge the Central Intelligence Agency’s refusal to
publish detailed records as allegedly required by the Accounts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7).
97. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 338, 346 (2006) (rejecting state taxpayer
standing to bring a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to franchise tax credits designed to
persuade DaimlerChrysler not to move a factory out of state).
98. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105−06.
99. See DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 347.
100. Flast, 392 U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
101. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 467−68, 482 (1982).
102. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
103. Id. at 479.
104. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
105. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 480.
106. Id. (“Secondly, and perhaps redundantly . . . .”).
107. Id. at 480 n.17; see also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June
25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2586–87 n.2 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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standing to challenge congressional spending that allegedly violates the
Establishment Clause.108
Valley Forge suggests that an executive agency’s discretionary acts
fail the first part of the Flast nexus test simply because the Executive
Branch, rather than the Legislative Branch, has performed the
challenged action.109 The Court later clarified, however, that once
Congress has authorized spending to administer a statute, the fact that an
executive agency chose to spend the appropriated funds in violation of
the Establishment Clause will not preclude taxpayer standing.110 Bowen
v. Kendrick111 allowed standing for an as-applied challenge to the
Adolescent Family Life Act112 based on grants given to religious
organizations at the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.113 The Court held that this challenge passed the first part of the
Flast nexus test because the Secretary administered the spending of
funds approved by Congress.114 Thus clarifying the issue left open in
Valley Forge, Bowen allowed standing under Flast for challenges to
executive administration of federal statutes.115
In sum, the Court has fashioned and maintained a narrow exception to
the general ban on taxpayer standing.116 Recognizing the sound policy of
Frothingham’s ban on generalized grievances, the Court has applied
Flast’s two-part nexus test strictly.117 The Court did not revisit this line
of cases until Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. during
the 2006 Term.118

108. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 479.
109. See id.
110. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619−20 (1988).
111. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 300z to z-10 (1982 & Supp. II 1985). The Act set a regulatory structure for
giving grants to groups focused on teenage sexual activity and pregnancy. Id.
113. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593, 618.
114. Id. at 619.
115. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct.
2553, 2567 (2007); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 619–20.
116. For discussion of minimalist nature of this narrow exception, see infra Part IV.A.
117. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (“We lack that confidence [to allow
taxpayer standing] in cases such as Frothingham where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court
as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the
allocation of power in the Federal System.”).
118. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2561−62.
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III. THE COURT IN HEIN DISAGREED ABOUT THE VALIDITY
AND APPLICATION OF FLAST
The Court in Hein issued four separate opinions. Justice Alito wrote
the plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy
joined. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion expands on separation of
powers issues. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
judgment but substantially disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning.
Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. The first section of Part III of this Note discusses the facts and
procedural history of the litigation leading to the Court’s opinions. The
rest of Part III explores the reasoning of each opinion.
A.

Hein Challenged Certain Aspects of President Bush’s Faith-Based
Initiatives

In Hein, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. (FFRF)
challenged both the constitutionality of conferences designed to train
religious groups on how to successfully apply for federal aid, and the
religiously themed speeches given at these conferences by President
George W. Bush and other executive officers.119 The litigation grew out
of an Executive Order120 that created the Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives (OFBCI) within the Executive Office of the
President.121 The Order charged OFBCI with ensuring that religious
groups providing community services could compete on an equal
playing field with secular groups providing similar services when
applying for federal aid.122 Congress did not create the OFBCI, and
funding came from general Executive Branch funds rather than specific
congressional appropriations.123
FFRF claimed taxpayer standing under Flast as its sole basis for
standing in federal court.124 The district court dismissed the case for lack
of standing because FFRF did not challenge an exercise of congressional

119. Id. at 2559.
120. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2001), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.A. ch. 2 annots., at 451–
52 (2005).
121. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
122. Id. at 2559−60 (citing 3 C.F.R. 752–753).
123. Id. at 2560.
124. Id. at 2561.
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power.125 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a divided
panel reversed the district court ruling, holding that Flast allows
standing to challenge government actions “financed by a congressional
appropriation,” even if the spending was not pursuant to any statutory
program.126 One judge dissented from the panel decision, warning that
the Court of Appeals’ holding threatened to broaden standing under
Flast.127 The Court of Appeals then denied rehearing en banc, and a
concurring opinion suggested that the Supreme Court needed to resolve
the issue.128 The Court granted certiorari to resolve this dispute.129
The Court divided sharply, issuing four separate opinions: (1) Justice
Alito’s plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy;130 (2) Justice Kennedy’s concurrence;131 (3) Justice Scalia’s
concurrence in the judgment and disagreement with the plurality’s
reasoning, joined by Justice Thomas;132 and (4) the dissenting opinion of
the remaining four Justices, who would have found standing.133 When no
opinion commands the support of five Justices, the narrowest opinion
that concurs in the judgment controls the case.134 As discussed below,
because the plurality opinion expressed the narrowest grounds leading to
reversal of the Court of Appeals, Justice Alito’s opinion controls.135

125. Id.
126. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d
sub nom., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct.
2553, 2559 (2007)).
127. Chao, 433 F.3d at 997−98, 1000 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
128. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988, 988 (7th Cir. 2006) (Flaum,
C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 989 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc).
129. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2561−62.
130. Id. at 2559.
131. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting).
134. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation and the Future of Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV 115, 130 (2008) (noting that Marks sets the standard for
determining the controlling opinion when no majority of the court joins a single opinion).
135. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing
Justice Alito’s opinion as controlling without explicitly stating why or citing Marks); see also Lupu,
supra note 134, at 130, 130 n.80 (discussing whether Justice Alito’s or Justice Kennedy’s is the most
narrow, but suggesting that it “may not make any tangible difference in the outcome of future cases
in the lower courts”).
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B.

Justice Alito Denied Standing by Distinguishing Precedent in His
Plurality Opinion

The plurality embraced the narrowness of Flast and its progeny,
especially Valley Forge, and applied the “Flast exception” with
“rigor.”136 In so doing, the plurality described Flast as a case involving
specific and direct congressional spending alleged to violate the
Establishment Clause.137 Focusing on the first part of the nexus test, the
plurality found the link between congressional action and the challenged
executive acts too attenuated to support standing.138 While Bowen
allowed a challenge to the administration of a congressional statute that
was left to the discretion of an executive agency, the plurality
distinguished Bowen as only applying to the administration of federal
statutes.139 Key to this conclusion was the plurality’s observation that
FFRF “can cite no statute whose application they challenge.”140 Even
though Congress had allocated funds for the operation of executive
agencies and those funds were used to pay for the conferences at issue,
Congress had played no role in the creation of the OFBCI and had
imposed no restrictions on the use of these operational funds.141
Therefore, because FFRF had no congressional action to challenge, there
was no nexus between FFRF’s taxpayer injury and Congress’s use of the
taxing and spending power.142
Where FFRF claimed that distinguishing between legislative and
executive acts that violate the Establishment Clause did not make sense,
the plurality explained that “Flast focused on congressional action, and
we must decline this invitation to extend its holding to encompass
discretionary Executive Branch expenditures.”143 The plurality viewed
Flast as creating a narrow exception limited to a small range of
situations, and thus followed past precedent, which had refused to apply

136. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 481 (1982)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2568.
139. Id. at 2567.
140. Id.
141. Id. See also id. at 2568 n.7 (“Nor is it relevant that Congress may have informally
‘earmarked’ portions of its general Executive Branch appropriations to fund the offices and centers
whose expenditures are at issue here.”).
142. Id. at 2568.
143. Id.
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the Flast exception to other situations.144 Separation of powers concerns
informed the decision to keep Flast confined to congressional statutes.145
Specifically, the Court reasoned that allowing standing to challenge the
vast range of executive activities funded through general operating
budgets any time a taxpayer alleges an Establishment Clause violation
would seriously aggrandize the power of the judiciary at the expense of
the executive.146
In response to the charge that immunizing the executive from the type
of review Flast imposes upon Congress would give agencies a loophole
to exploit, the plurality suggested that Congress could stop such abuse
through statute.147 Also, the plurality reasoned that egregious
Establishment Clause violations often produce injuries more
particularized than taxpayer injury, and these injuries would support
standing outside the context of Flast.148 Ultimately, the plurality viewed
its ruling as a narrow resolution of the case at hand.149 Seeing no
justification for expanding Flast and no need to overrule it, Justice Alito
declared, “[w]e leave Flast as we found it.”150
C.

Justice Kennedy Explained in His Concurring Opinion Why Hein
Is Distinguishable from Flast

Although he joined the plurality “in full,” Justice Kennedy wrote
separately to explain his views on separation of powers and Flast.151
Justice Kennedy agreed that Flast should not support standing in this
case, based on concerns over separation of powers.152 Fearing “judicial
oversight of executive duties,” he stated that allowing standing for this

144. Id. at 2568−69.
145. Id. at 2569–70.
146. Id. at 2569−70.
147. Id. at 2571.
148. Id. For illustrations of such injuries, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584 (1992)
(recognizing a student’s injury for being subjected to school-sponsored prayer at a graduation
ceremony rather than relying on taxpayer standing); cf. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v.
Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom., Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (plurality
opinion) (“No doubt so elaborate, so public, a subvention of religion [as a government official
building a mosque with federal funds] would give rise to standing to sue on other grounds [besides
taxpayer standing].”).
149. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572.
150. Id. at 2571−72.
151. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572.
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type of case would cast the courts in the “role of speech editors . . . and
event planners” for the Executive Branch.153 Mindful of the potential for
abuse in situations where plaintiffs will have a hard time gaining
standing to challenge the Executive Branch, Justice Kennedy stated that
government officials must “conform their actions” to the Constitution.154
Regarding Flast’s validity, Justice Kennedy gave Flast a much
warmer embrace than the plurality, declaring that “the result reached in
Flast is correct and should not be called into question.”155 On the one
hand, discussion of the soundness of Flast’s holding as a policy matter,
being unnecessary to the plurality’s conclusion, reaches more broadly
and should not be controlling.156 Yet, when combined with the four
dissenting Justices that clearly support Flast, Justice Kennedy’s view
commands a majority of the Court in this respect and could be viewed as
a controlling statement.157
D.

Justice Scalia Urged Broadly Overruling Flast

In stark contrast to the plurality’s minimalism, Justice Scalia’s
opinion called for a complete reversal of Flast on all grounds, regardless
of the case at hand.158 Justice Scalia portrayed the taxpayer injury in
cases like Flast as a “Psychic Injury” and questioned why such mental
injuries should ever support standing.159 Calling Flast and the cases
following it a “jurisprudential disaster,”160 Justice Scalia argued that
overruling was the only principled approach.161 This opinion attacked
the plurality’s minimalist approach for being based on meaningless

153. Id. at 2572−73.
154. Id. at 2573.
155. Id.
156. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
157. Cf. Lupu, supra note 134, at 130 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s opinion may be more
narrow because it is “more respectful of the pre-existing law,” thus supporting the inference that
five Justices agree that Flast is good law).
158. Id. at 2573−74 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
159. Id. at 2574−75. Use of the term “Psychic Injury” leads to confusion, because some “psychic”
injuries, like infliction of mental distress, are sufficient for standing, while “ideological” injuries
generally are not. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,”
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 188−89 (1992).
160. For a previous “jurisprudential disaster,” see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Lee recognized religious “coercion” as an Establishment Clause violation.
Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
161. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584.
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distinctions used to distinguish past precedent.162 Thus, Justice Scalia
argued that Doremus cannot be reconciled with Flast163 and that more
generally, Flast is inconsistent with the constitutional limits on standing
described in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife164 because taxpayer injury
can never be an injury in fact.165
E.

Justice Souter Argued in His Dissenting Opinion That Hein and
Flast Present the Same Injury

In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that the injury to taxpayers is the
same whether Congress or the Executive Branch spends the funds, and
thus, that standing should exist for both types of claims.166 Rather than
reading Flast narrowly to allow standing only to challenge spending
pursuant to a congressional mandate, the dissent read Flast to apply
logically no matter which branch of the government spent the funds.167
The dissent also recognized the distinction between Flast and Doremus,
but suggested that because identifiable amounts of federal funds
financed the challenged conferences, Doremus did not preclude standing
for FFRF.168 Addressing separation of powers, the dissent argued that
Flast already allowed federal court plaintiffs to challenge these types of
congressional spending decisions and that the Executive Branch should
receive no more insulation from these lawsuits than Congress.169 Finally,
regarding the plurality’s distinguishing of Bowen, Justice Souter saw no
difference between discretion in the administration of a statute and
discretion outside the administration of a statute.170
IV. HEIN EXEMPLIFIES THE PROPER ROLE OF MINIMALISM
IN JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
Having explored the foundation of Establishment Clause taxpayer
standing and having surveyed the various opinions in Hein, the question

162. Id. at 2582.
163. Id. at 2577.
164. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
165. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2574.
166. Id. at 2584−85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
168. See id. at 2585.
169. Id. at 2586.
170. Id.
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remains whether minimalism makes sense in the context of taxpayer
standing doctrine. By “not doing”171 the deathblow to Flast and instead
doing only what was necessary to resolve the case at hand, the plurality
avoided issuing a broad ruling that would reach too far. Of the
competing opinions in Hein, the plurality opinion is the most consistent
with the values of minimalism and the limited role of federal courts.
This Part argues first that the Establishment Clause exception for
taxpayer standing is itself a minimalist doctrine intended to allow
standing in a narrow range of cases without allowing the exception to
swallow the rule against taxpayer standing. The minimalist nature of
Flast supports the minimalist solution in Hein. Second, Flast is
consistent with other standing decisions. Third, under the Casey factors,
there is a lack of compelling reasons to abandon the Establishment
Clause taxpayer standing doctrine that Flast v. Cohen created,
supporting the plurality’s minimalist solution in Hein. Fourth, the
potential negative effects of the plurality’s narrow ruling are speculative
and should be left for later resolution if the need arises. Finally, some
situations demand broader rulings, providing limits to the usefulness of
minimalism.
A.

Flast Created a Minimalist Doctrine

The Court’s narrow holding in Flast, which created the two-part
nexus test as a limited exception to the general ban on federal taxpayer
standing, exhibits many minimalist qualities. Most significantly, the
Court could have overruled Frothingham and opened up a vast realm of
taxpayer standing, as indeed one member of the Court advocated.172
Instead, the Court distinguished Frothingham as failing the second part
of the nexus test because the constitutional provisions invoked by the
Frothingham plaintiffs173 did not impose limitations on the taxing and

171. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 71.
172. Flast, 392 U.S. at 107 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the narrow exception
will slowly get larger and erode Frothingham and that the Court should overrule Frothingham). The
majority viewed Frothingham favorably and fashioned the exception in Flast very narrowly to
preserve Frothingham in most situations. See id. at 106 (majority opinion) (“We lack that
confidence [to allow taxpayer standing] in cases such as Frothingham where a taxpayer seeks to
employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of
government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.”).
173. The plaintiffs relied on the Tenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479−80 (1923).
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spending power.174 While Frothingham broadly banned federal taxpayer
standing,175 Flast gave Frothingham a narrower scope.176 Even more
minimally, the Court in Flast declined to name any constitutional
provisions other than the Establishment Clause that limit Congress’s
taxing and spending power.177 The Court went only as far as necessary,
leaving the evaluation of other constitutional provisions to “the context
of future cases.”178 By creating a narrow exception with a minimal
scope, the Court ensured that Flast’s limited exception would not
become a large one that would lead to the abandonment of the principles
underlying the general rule of Frothingham.179 Subsequent cases have
clarified and limited Flast, maintaining the minimalist nature of the
Establishment Clause taxpayer standing doctrine.180
B.

Flast Is Consistent with Standing Doctrine Generally

Flast has not been overruled by the constitutionalization of
standing.181 In his opinion, Justice Scalia argued that Flast improperly
allows standing without any particularized injury,182 but Federal
Election Commission v. Akins183 suggests that taxpayer injury can be a
valid injury for standing purposes.184 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife held
174. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105.
175. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
176. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105. However, because the Flast exception to Frothingham is quite
narrow, Frothingham only went from being always applicable to almost always applicable. See
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553,
2564−65 (2007) (plurality opinion); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974).
177. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105.
178. Id.
179. See supra Part II.
180. See supra Part II.C.
181. By “constitutionalization of standing” I mean post-Flast cases that define standing as having
an “irreducible constitutional minimum.” See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992) (collecting and summarizing prior cases fleshing out the injury, traceability, and
redressability requirements that the Court has created based on Article III); see also Myriam E.
Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89
CAL. L. REV. 315, 329 (2001) (“[The Lujan majority] began by explicitly recognizing [the Court’s]
gradual constitutionalization of standing doctrine.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
23 (1984) (referring to the “constitutionalization of remedial standing”).
182. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2582−83 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
183. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
184. See id. at 24 (“Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it is widely shared
go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though

308

MCNAMARA_FINAL_2.DOC

6/10/2008 5:52:02 PM

Forceful Minimalism
that the Constitution requires a plaintiff to claim a valid injury to have
standing to sue in federal court.185 Defining what constitutes a valid
injury, however, involves prudential decisions by the Court rather than
clear constitutional directives.186 Thus, consistent with Lujan and
constitutional standing doctrine, the Court can declare certain injuries as
valid for standing purposes, as in fact the Court has done in cases such
as Flast and Akins.
Justice Scalia also argued in his Hein concurrence that Flast
fashioned its two-part nexus to circumvent prior precedent.187 But,
Doremus and Flast have managed to coexist based on the distinction
between statutes that command certain behavior and statutes that create
spending programs.188 In the former case, Congress has not invoked the
power to tax and spend, while in the latter case, it has.189 Though almost
all government action involves some expenditure of funds,190 there is a
meaningful difference between spending incidental to regulatory
activity191 and spending pursuant to a statutory mandate.192 Invoking the
power to tax and spend in violation of a specific constitutional limitation
on that power is what underlies the Flast nexus test. Similar to Doremus,
in Hein, FFRF lacked standing because it did not challenge an exercise
of the taxing and spending power.193 While Justice Scalia did not accept
such a distinction, the plurality did, and thus the plurality could deny

widely shared, the Court has found injury in fact.”) (citations omitted); see also Hein, 127 S. Ct. at
2587 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Akins to suggest the harm in Hein was concrete and widely
shared).
185. 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
186. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It does not, however,
follow that suits brought by [plaintiffs claiming non-standard injuries] are excluded by the ‘case or
controversy’ clause of Article III of the Constitution from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”); cf.
Sunstein, supra note 159, at 190 (“[W]hether there is a so-called nonjusticiable ideological interest,
or instead a legally cognizable ‘actual injury,’ is a product of legal conventions and nothing else.”);
Fletcher, supra note 68, at 232 (“A statement that a plaintiff . . . suffered no ‘injury in fact’ [is]
based on some normative judgment about what ought to constitute a judicially cognizable
injury . . . [and] not whether an actual injury occurred.”).
187. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2577 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the first prong
of the nexus test circumvents Doremus, and the second prong does the same with Frothingham).
188. See supra note 89.
189. See id.
190. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2569 (plurality opinion).
191. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102 (1968).
192. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619−20 (1988).
193. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568.
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standing without having to overrule any precedent.194 Such an approach
avoids a broad ruling and potential “jurisprudential disasters”195 that
might otherwise follow, choosing instead to confront such “disasters”
when they materialize.
C.

Overruling Flast at This Time Is Inconsistent with Stare Decisis

By arguing to overrule Flast, Justice Scalia advocated abandoning the
continued reliance on Flast as precedent. Although the Court did not
need to overrule Flast to reach its judgment in Hein, Justice Scalia, in
his opinion concurring in the judgment, posed the question of whether
Flast merits continued adherence. This section weighs the factors
discussed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey196 that provide guidance when deciding whether to overrule
precedent.
Although the Court has essentially limited Flast to its facts,197 the
principles of stare decisis discussed in Casey do not support its
abrogation.198 Regarding the first Casey factor—practical workability—
Flast, Valley Forge, Bowen, and Hein demonstrate that taxpayer
standing doctrine is capable of working in practice.199 Second, although
Flast arguably may not have created a strong reliance interest for
plaintiffs because “one does not arrange his affairs with an eye to
standing,”200 a precedent should not be overruled simply because few
will mourn its passing.201 A lack of reliance reduces the consequences of
overruling a precedent but does not provide a principled reason for
abandoning settled law.202 Third, Flast is not a remnant of an abandoned
194. Compare id. at 2577 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) with id. at 2568 (plurality
opinion).
195. See supra note 160.
196. 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
197. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568−69.
198. For a discussion of the Casey factors, see supra Part I.C.
199. Compare Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries,
Inc., 509 F.3d 406, 420 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying Hein to find taxpayer standing based on specific
appropriations by the Iowa legislature) with Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) and Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988, 989−90 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (stating there is “no logical way to
determine the extent of an arbitrary rule”).
200. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
201. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (suggesting that there needs to be a
compelling justification to overrule a precedent).
202. Cf. id.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56 (discussing the reliance interest of precedent).
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doctrine no matter how one frames the relevant doctrine.203 Finally,
Flast does not rely on such outdated facts that it has lost “significant
application or justification.”204 Even if Hein presents weak facts, the
underlying system of faith-based initiatives presents live constitutional
issues without easy resolution.205
Justice Scalia may disagree with the Court that taxpayers suffer a
judicially cognizable injury, but the doctrine of stare decisis does not
allow overruling precedent just because the Court might have ruled on
this issue differently from the way the Court ruled in Flast.206 Because
Flast fits within the broad and varied umbrella of standing doctrine,
Flast remains a vital part of a living doctrine and should not be
overruled, even if the Court were forced to decide that question. While
future development of the law may eventually render Flast an
anachronism, minimalism demands that overruling wait until the arrival
of these future developments.207
D.

Potential Abuses of Loopholes Created by Hein Should Be
Adjudicated When and if They Arise

Because minimalism seeks to reduce the risk and limit the scope of
judicial error,208 the plurality opinion’s success depends upon the
potential negative consequences it might create. Justice Souter argued in
his dissent that the plurality’s distinction between legislative and
executive action creates an improper disparity in taxpayer standing
doctrine that could lead to abuse by creative executive agencies.209
Justice Scalia went even further, suggesting some ways such abuse could
203. If the doctrine at issue is taxpayer standing generally, then Flast is a narrowly carved
exception to the general doctrine banning taxpayer standing. See supra Part II. Instead, if the
relevant doctrine is Establishment Clause taxpayer standing, that doctrine has at least some life, as
evidenced by its continued litigation. See, e.g., Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v.
Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406, 420 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing taxpayer standing
for a challenge to prison religious programs). Likewise, if standing doctrine itself is the relevant
issue, this doctrine too has not been abandoned. See supra Part II.
204. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
205. See, e.g., Equal Treatment in Dep’t of Labor Programs for Faith-Based & Cmty. Orgs., 69
Fed. Reg. 41,882, 41,884−86 (July 12, 2004) (responding to public commentary about the proposed
rule through extensive legal argument about the rule’s constitutionality).
206. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
207. Cf. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct.
2553, 2571−72 (2007) (leaving hypothetical cases to be resolved only if they become actual cases).
208. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 46.
209. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2586 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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occur.210 For example, Congress could try to immunize an agency from
taxpayer challenges either by allocating generic operational funds or by
expressly limiting the use of funds to programs that comply with the
Establishment Clause.211 Although the former might be more effective
than the latter under Hein,212 both involve spending pursuant to a federal
statute. Bowen suggests, and Hein seems to reinforce, that as long as
Congress creates the specific spending program at issue, the nexus will
exist to support taxpayer standing.213
Ultimately, these concerns do not amount to much.214 Speculating
about these concerns presents a deeper problem: this involves extended
hypothesizing about facts not before the Court. While judges naturally
consider the future effects of their rulings, minimalists decide one case at
a time and reconcile previous rulings with the unique facts of later cases
as they arise.215 When litigants in subsequent cases argue for precedent
to be applied in ways that reach questionable results, courts can modify
the doctrine at issue to avoid such problems.216 This is exactly what the
plurality did in Hein: it declined to extend Flast outside the realm of
congressional action.217 Once the hypothetical abuses imagined by
Justices Scalia and Souter come before the Court, if they ever do come

210. Id. at 2580 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
211. Id.
212. The former example at least leaves the choice of how to spend the appropriated funds to
executive discretion, thus minimizing congressional involvement in the way the funds are spent.
The latter example involves more congressional involvement, and thus more of a nexus. But see id.
at 2580 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the plurality’s reasoning would allow
Congress to immunize executive action from suit simply by “codifying the truism that no
appropriation can be spent by the Executive Branch in a manner that violates the Establishment
Clause.”).
213. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2567 (plurality opinion); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619−20
(1988); cf. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568 (suggesting that a congressional statute creating the spending
program is prerequisite to standing under Flast).
214. Compare Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2586 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the executive can
now “accomplish through the exercise of discretion exactly what Congress cannot do through
legislation”) with id. at 2571 (plurality opinion) (noting that egregious actions like using
“discretionary funds to build a house of worship” are both unlikely and remediable without taxpayer
standing). It is worth noting, however, that President Bush only created the OFBCI through
Executive Order after legislative attempts stalled in Congress. See Lupu, supra note 135, at 48−49.
Had Congress created the OFBCI through statute, FFRF might well have had standing under Flast.
Id.
215. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 44.
216. Id. at 44−45.
217. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571.
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before the Court,218 the Court can, with the benefit of fully developed
facts, evaluate whether to modify taxpayer standing doctrine to address
such abuse.219 The minimalist judge leaves such thorny issues for later
resolution, addressing them only if facts arise that require facing them
directly. If the abuses hypothesized in Hein never emerge, then the
plurality wisely avoided grappling with them prematurely.
E.

Minimalism Is Not Always the Appropriate Method of Adjudication

Minimalism reaches its limit when fundamental notions of justice
demand a ruling more expansive than minimalism provides. Some cases
demand broad rulings,220 perhaps the most famous and revered being the
landmark school desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka.221 Such a rare and monumental case demands sweeping moral
judgment: by 1954, the societal view of the Constitution had evolved to
reject segregation to such an extent that the Court realistically could not
avoid resolving the issue. A minimalist ruling––holding, perhaps, that
although Topeka’s segregation program violated the Constitution, the
school segregation programs in Virginia and Delaware222 could survive
constitutional scrutiny—would likely have encouraged school districts to
craftily tailor programs that fit within some narrower scope of acceptable
discrimination. By contrast, consider the cases from 1976 that struck
down some state death penalty laws while upholding others.223 Rather
than holding the death penalty either constitutional or unconstitutional
per se, the Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment to permit death penalty statutes that provide clear
criteria for imposing the sentence but allow for discretion in the
218. There is sufficient doubt whether such abuses might occur. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571.
219. Cf. id. (“In the unlikely event that any of these [hypothetical] executive actions did take
place, Congress could quickly step in.”).
220. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 37−38.
221. 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954).
222. Brown involved consolidated cases challenging school segregation programs in Delaware,
Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
223. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Georgia’s death
penalty law for imposing the sentence fairly); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259−60 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (upholding Florida’s law on similar grounds as Georgia’s law); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Texas’s law on similar grounds); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking North Carolina’s
death penalty law as unfair because it triggered automatically for “a broad category of homicidal
offenses”); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331−32 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking
Louisiana’s law on similar grounds as North Carolina’s law).
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penalty’s imposition.224 After the Court handed down these minimalist
opinions, states could narrowly tailor their statutes to fit within the
approved ranges.225
The decision to issue a broad ruling carries great risk and should not
be made lightly. Brown came as the culmination of a protracted series of
cases chipping away at the block of Jim Crow226 and thirteen years after
the Court avoided the issue in Pullman.227 Other famous broad cases,
like Dred Scott v. Sandford228 and Roe v. Wade,229 came suddenly,
without buildup, and either proved disastrous (Dred Scott) or highly
contentious (Roe).230 Only when the Court can be certain its moral
judgment is correct and necessary should it issue such broad rulings, and
even then this path is fraught with risk: the Court in Dred Scott perhaps
felt the same moral certainty as the Court in Brown.231
In the context of Establishment Clause taxpayer standing, the
likelihood of such a morally compelling case seems unlikely because
standing decisions focus on procedural requirements, rather than on the
underlying substantive rights.232 Although Establishment Clause cases
decided on the merits may call for broad rulings at times,233 standing
doctrine is a naturally minimalist area of the law that seeks to limit court
decisions on the merits to situations that require such adjudication.234
Flast opened courthouse doors that were previously closed by
Frothingham, but only enough to let the occasional plaintiff plead an
Establishment Clause claim.235 Rather than eroding away at the
224. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (1976); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259−60 (1976); Jurek, 428 U.S. at
276; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286, 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331−32 (1976).
225. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
524−37 (Simon & Schuster 2005) (1979).
226. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 38.
227. See supra Part I.
228. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
229. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
230. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 36−37.
231. See id. at 37 (“[Dred Scott] shows that judicial efforts to resolve questions of political
morality now and for all time may well be futile.”).
232. The Establishment Clause taxpayer standing doctrine focuses on the nature of the underlying
right, but it does not consider the merits of the specific alleged violation.
233. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (incorporating the
Establishment Clause to be applicable to the states, and beginning the intense judicial scrutiny of
government involvement with religion).
234. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 117.
235. See supra Part II.
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Frothingham ban, as Justice Douglas predicted,236 Flast created a narrow
way for courts to hear seemingly meritorious Establishment Clause cases
without abandoning the ban on generalized grievances.237 Cases like
Valley Forge, Bowen, and Hein use minimalism to develop the Flast
doctrine incrementally, leaving room for further corrections as needed.
Just as Bowen clarified Valley Forge and Hein clarified Bowen,
ambiguities in Hein can be clarified when required by the next case.
Over time, if the Flast exception leads to unacceptable results or
constitutional standing doctrine shifts to such an extent that Flast
becomes anachronistic and unworkable, then the time may arrive to
issue a broad ruling overturning Flast, much like Brown overturned
Plessy v. Ferguson.238 On the other hand, perhaps morally compelling
cases will emerge where Flast does not support standing and yet only
taxpayers have any claim of injury at all. If the Court feels the moral
duty to reach the merits on such a case, the minimalist approach taken by
the plurality in Hein would not suffice. Justice Breyer suggested some
hypothetical situations during oral argument in Hein that might fit this
situation.239 Ultimately, such hypothetical cases would have to be
evaluated on their facts if they ever actually arose, and the Court would
have to decide if the merits were so compelling as to warrant finding
standing, even if a narrow reading of standing doctrine counseled
otherwise.240
V.

CONCLUSION

Minimalism provides a method by which courts can address the
narrow issues necessary to resolve the case at hand without broadly
reaching out to decide, possibly erroneously, issues beyond the scope of

236. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 107 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
237. For an argument that all standing decisions should be evaluations of the merits of the case,
see generally Fletcher, supra note 68.
238. Brown v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that doctrine of
“separate but equal” has no place in public education).
239. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16−19, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found, Inc., 551
U.S. ___ (June 25, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (No. 06-157). Justice Breyer’s first hypothetical
asked if a taxpayer would have standing to challenge the federal government’s construction of an
official church at Plymouth Rock to commemorate the Pilgrims. Id. at 16. Justice Breyer also
questioned whether taxpayer standing would be available to challenge a federal statute establishing
one religion but that did not give money to any private religious groups. Id. at 17–18.
240. See generally Lupu, supra note 134, at 155–64 (exploring the availability of both taxpayer
standing and other forms of standing for difficult Establishment Clause cases post-Hein).
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the current case. The Court developed Establishment Clause taxpayer
standing in Flast as a narrow exception to the rule against federal
taxpayer standing based on a two-part nexus test designed to limit
standing to cases where taxpayer injury could be directly linked to the
exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power. Subsequent cases
construed this exception narrowly, and the plurality in Hein maintained
this minimalist approach by refusing to extend Flast to cover purely
executive actions without Congress’s involvement. Over strong calls for
the reversal of Flast, the plurality in Hein distinguished past cases to
deny standing without disrupting precedent. Although this minimalist
approach left open some difficult questions about separation of powers
and possible abuses of executive discretion, these questions were
properly left to be resolved later, should the need arise. Because the
plurality avoided unnecessarily overruling precedent and left difficult,
though hypothetical, problems to be resolved only when later cases
demand resolution, this minimalist approach resolved the case at hand
without running the risk of overreaching and making errors where no
actions were needed. While the minimalist approach may fail in
exceptional cases, for the majority of decisions, especially in areas of
justiciability, the best thing the Court does is “not doing.”241

241. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 71.
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